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Hard cases make bad law, claimed Holmes. The effective rejoinder
is that hard cases compel us to display and justify the governing
normative principles of our constitutional scheme that are otherwise
camouflaged when we routinely handle the "non-hard" case.
Hard cases for mediators perform the same function. They throw
into relief those matters regarding case definition and selection, strategic
options, and intervenor ethics that any mediation effort must address.
They enable judicial administrators and mediation participants alike to
gain a sharpened sense of which of these issues are settled, which remain
controversial, and which matters are best resolved from the lessons of
experience. Given the burgeoning explosion of court-annexed mediation
programs to handle all kinds of docketed cases, sharpened insights about
these matters must be warmly embraced.
The MOVE crisis was a hard case for mediators. Extremist Groups
and Conflict Resolution: The MOVE Crisis in Philadelphia' [hereinafter
Extremist Groups] gives us a breathtaking account of this social conflict
that bristles with misunderstandings, escalating rhetoric, profound fears,
competing legal principles, controversial law enforcement strategies, and
wrenching political trade-offs. Well-motivated but unsuccessful efforts
by concerned intervenors could not prevent the tangible loss of life,
property, and financial resources that citizens of Philadelphia incurred
during that 10-year period. As a case study, Extremist Groups should
be required reading for all persons involved in matters relating to dispute
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settlement. Managing Public Disputes2 and Getting Together' offer
prescriptive guidelines to advocates and intervenors that are designed
to enable them to engage effectively in voluntary, non-trial settlement
discussions; presumably, persons involved in the MOVE situation would
have enhanced the possibility of promoting a non-violent settlement had
they followed these principles. In Section I, I summarize the dynamics
of the MOVE encounters; in Section II, I describe the basic claims of
Managing Public Disputes and Getting Together and examine whether
their insights could have been helpful in the MOVE situation. In Section
III, I combine what I consider to be unassailable insights of these
authors with my critique of some of their basic claims in order to stake
out the critical agenda items for the expanded use of court-annexed
mediation programs.
I. THE MOVE CRISIS
There were two major encounters between the MOVE group and the
city of Philadelphia; the second received nationwide attention. Each is
summarized below.
A. Powelton Village, 1978
MOVE is short for "The Movement." It is a racially mixed coun-
terculture group consisting of no more than seventy-five adherents whose
stated purpose was "stopping man's system from imposing on life ...
stop[ping] industry from poisoning the air, the water, the soil ...
put[ting] an end to enslavement of life-people, animals, any form of
life. MOVE's work is to show people how corrupt, rotten, criminally
enslaving this system is ... 4
MOVE's lifestyle reflected its opposition to what it viewed as modern
technology and its consequences. Members minimized their use of ma-
chinery or electricity, ate no processed foods, bore children the "natural
way" at home, insisted on strong family ties and marital fidelity, required
everyone to participate in rigorous physical exercise, and disposed of
their refuse by "recycling" it back to nature. The major exceptions to
their antipathy towards technology were twofold: the accumulation of
weapons, and the use of electrically powered bullhorns.
In 1973, six MOVE members moved into a home in Powelton Village,
a racially integrated neighborhood in Philadelphia adjacent to two ex-
panding university communities. Life-style differences quickly generated
friction. Neighbors complained about garbage and fecal odor, rat in-
festation, inattention to the health and schooling needs of the children,
2. S. CARPENTER & W.J.D. KENNEDY, MANAGING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1988).
3. R. FISHER & S. BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER (1988).
4. H. ASSEFA & P. WAHRHAFTIG, supra note 1, at 11.
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and various housing code violations. MOVE members announced, through
the use of bullhorns during the late evening hours, that their neighbors'
lifestyles offended them. Tensions mounted. MOVE housed approxi-
mately fifty dogs at its residence; when it applied for a dog kennel
permit, Powelton neighbors appeared at the zoning meeting to oppose
MOVE's application. MOVE members allegedly retaliated by picketing
their neighbors' houses and threatening physical violence. The MOVE
"car wash," a primary source of income, was shut down by the city
for failure to obtain a license; neighbors had complained about the
traffic congestion and excess water and mud in the streets as a result
of this popular operation.
As the months passed, MOVE members expanded their activities to
other parts of the city. MOVE members gained public attention when
they demonstrated against the Philadelphia Zoo for caging animals; they
disrupted rallies, conferences, Board of Education meetings, and neigh-
borhood block parties in their efforts to propagate their philosophy.
When arrested by police on such charges as disorderly conduct, failure
to disperse, and resisting arrest, MOVE members charged that they
were beaten. When they appeared in court, they denounced the judicial
proceedings as part of the oppressive system that needed dismantling;
they refused to be represented by lawyers, claiming that none would
understand them. When their unconventional behavior resulted in re-
ceiving steep contempt sentences, MOVE claimed that it was simply
being harassed for its political and religious beliefs.
The turning point occurred in March, 1976. MOVE members held
a party to celebrate the release from jail of a group of their colleagues.
A fight broke out with the police. Bricks were thrown. Several police
officers and MOVE members suffered injuries. Three MOVE leaders
were convicted and sentenced to prison; freeing their brethren became
MOVE's major focus. In July, 1976, the city announced plans for an
inspection of the MOVE house by police, health officials, and social
workers. MOVE refused entry, building an eight-foot wall to keep the
inspectors out. No one entered. In May, 1977, a MOVE member was
evicted from a nearby apartment; he resisted, a scuffle ensued, and he
was arrested. MOVE members appeared on the porch of their now
barricaded house, wearing uniforms and carrying guns. Neighbors called
the police. More than 200 police were sent to the area; they established
stakeouts in nearby apartment buildings and cleared the streets. After
nine hours, the confrontation was defused without violence. Eleven
MOVE members were charged with weapons violations; the city vowed
to maintain a massive police presence to arrest the MOVE members
on these charges when they stepped outside their headquarters. About
100 plainclothes police were deployed around the clock in the area. The
siege had begun.
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The siege lasted ten months; it cost the city $1.2 million. During the
siege, sympathetic groups and individuals brought food and supplies
through police lines to sustain MOVE. Several neighborhood groups
formed; some wanted the city to forcefully address the situation while
others wanted the city to withdraw the police so that neighbors could
resolve the matters themselves. When the prolonged presence appeared
to be self-defeating and early efforts to negotiate a settlement failed,
the city sought an order to cut off utilities and prevent the entry of
food, water, and other necessities; its stated purpose was to starve out
the occupants and arrest them when they appeared. Sustained efforts
by citizens to construct a negotiated agreement met with temporary
success in May, 1978: hopes increased. But the agreement broke down.
The court approved an order to arrest all persons in the MOVE residence.
Three hundred armed police officers and firefighters arrived to enforce
the order. A shootout occurred. One police officer died; other police,
firefighters, and MOVE members were injured. Within two hours of
MOVE's surrender (an event that was televised locally), city bulldozers
razed the house.
B. Osage, 1985
New players and new sites, but the vestiges of the previous encounter
became the seeds of a profound disaster. MOVE members were brought
to trial in May, 1979 for charges stemming from the shootout at the
Powelton house. The trial, quiet through the first month, became a
circus. At a cost of twenty-one months and more than four hundred
thousand dollars, nine MOVE members were convicted of third-degree
murder; they were sentenced to prison terms of thirty to 100 years.
While that trial was in progress, the three police officers who had been
charged with beating a MOVE leader as they removed him from the
house during the surrender were also being tried; they were acquitted
by a trial judge who ordered a directed verdict in their favor prior to
counsel's closing arguments.
A few members of MOVE moved into a home on Osage Avenue in
1981. After an initial peaceful period, the lifestyle conflicts that plagued
the Powelton relationship began to emerge. Neighbors complained to
city officials. A different administration, headed by Mayor Wilson Goode,
was elected soon thereafter but chose to deflect the complaints. During
1984-85, tension on Osage Avenue escalated dramatically. MOVE used
its loudspeaker incessantly to preach its message for freeing political
prisoners; public employees who tried to engage city officials in discussion
with MOVE representatives were directed to cease such interaction
because the MOVE situation was "in fact a police matter."' In early
5. Id. at 109.
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1985, MOVE boarded up its home and fortified it by building a bunker
on the roof. Over its loudspeaker system, MOVE threatened to do
physical harm to any person-mayor, police, health inspector, utility
employee or neighbor-who would dare come in the MOVE residence.
On May 2, 1985, neighbors reported that they saw a five-gallon gasoline
can being hoisted to the MOVE rooftop; the next day, the Mayor,
concluding that an armed conflict with MOVE was a probability,
instructed the District Attorney to reexamine the legal grounds for the
city taking action against MOVE. An application for search and arrest
warrants on firearm charges was developed. On May 7, the Mayor
authorized the police commissioner to prepare and execute a tactical
plan to evict MOVE and arrest some members on misdemeanor charges.
The Police Commissioner delegated the task to three officers. On May
11, city officials obtained search and arrest warrants. On May 12, the
mayor, following a briefing by the police commissioner, approved the
eviction plan as developed by the three officers. That day, police
evacuated all Osage Avenue residents. On May 13, 1985 at 5:35 a.m.,
the police commissioner, standing near the MOVE residence, announced
over a bullhorn that four people inside MOVE's house were named in
arrest warrants and had fifteen minutes to surrender. MOVE used its
loudspeaker to announce its refusal. At 5:50 a.m., police fired tear gas
and smoke projectiles to enable officers to get into position. In the
following ninety minutes, police shot at least 10,000 rounds of ammu-
nition. By 10:40 a.m., the front of the MOVE house had been blown
out, but MOVE members had not budged. At 3:45 p.m., Mayor Goode,
in a televised news conference, stated his intention to seize control of
the house. The fateful steps are described:
[T]he police commissioner ... instructed the head of the Bomb Disposal
Unit to assemble an explosive package to dislodge the bunker that MOVE
had constructed on top of their house. It would be dropped from a helicopter.
At 5:27 p.m., the bomb was dropped. It failed to dislodge the bunker
immediately, but it ignited the gasoline tank and started a fire. The police
and fire commissioners let the fire burn. The flames quickly engulfed the
house and spread to neighboring homes. At 6:32 p.m., the fire department
turned its hoses on the fire for the first time ... [T]he flames ... were
not contained until 11:41 p.m. By then nearly two square blocks of residential
neighborhood had been burned. Fire destroyed 61 homes, damaged 110
others, and killed 11 occupants of the MOVE home, 5 of them children.
Some 250 men, women and children were left homeless. Of those in the
MOVE's house, only one woman and one child survived .... 6
II. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT PROCESSES AND SKILLS
I start from the proposition that the outcomes in both situations were
6. Id. at 113.
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not desirable. The question is how they could have been avoided.
Getting Together defines a good working relationship as one that is
able to "deal well with differences.' 7 Getting Together separates rela-
tionship issues-those that concern the way we deal with people-from
the substantive issues that might typically be included in an agreement.
It argues that while both sets of issues must be addressed, their analysis
and resolution should not be linked to one another; a relationship should
not be conditioned upon one's adversary making a concession nor should
it be established by trying to "buy" it by unilaterally making an important
substantive accommodation. A robust relationship, Getting Together
claims, should be capable of efficiently producing durable outcomes
that satisfy the competing interests as well as possible, with little waste,
and in a way that appears legitimate in the eyes of each of the parties
even in the face of differences in values, perceptions, and interests.
That is, a good working relationship is most important in precisely those
situations in which the most serious disagreements arise.
Managing Public Disputes offers contrary advice. It maintains that
conflicts between parties over their ideologies are not amenable to
constructive negotiations because two ingredients are absent: it is not
possible to reframe the issues into solvable increments and there is not
an effective core of moderate people on both sides of the argument to
carry on a dialogue. Extremist Groups suggests that MOVE leaders
were "consciously irrational." One is reminded of the negotiating di-
lemma created by Schelling's driver who, in playing chicken, creates a
quandary for his adversary by making an "Irrevocable commitment."
Were the city participants correct to treat the Osage events as conflicts
over ideology and thereby discard the use of nonviolent conflict resolution
processes in the Osage incident by making it "a police matter"?
Getting Together seems on better grounds here. Consider the diffi-
culties: who decides what an "extremist" group - or "extremist" position
- is? Is MOVE's refusal to register the births of their children with
the Health Department an extreme position? Citizen negotiators Palmer
and Gaskins spent nine months working on behalf of MOVE to establish
a dialogue with various city officials and develop viable settlement
options. One of Gaskins' imaginative proposals allowed the city not to
make an exception to ordinary legal procedures in dealing with MOVE
prisoners but allowed MOVE members not to remain incarcerated; would
the absence of such imagination be identified as just that-lack of
vision-or would we be inclined to label MOVE's proposal to "let the
prisoners off" as "extremist"? The danger of characterizing negotiating
groups-or their proposals-as extremist is that it gives conceptual
support to the notion that their proposals require "all or nothing"
7. R. FISHER & S. BROWN, supra note 3, at 14.
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responses, thereby aborting the possibility of dialogue. Rarely are we
in such situations.
But how, and with whom, does one try to establish these "working
relationships"? Getting Together addresses the first concern but ignores
the second; Managing Public Disputes offers valuable insights about
both. The premise of Getting Together is that while two or more parties
are required for having a relationship, it takes only one to change its
quality. It sets out a series of guidelines that are characterized as
"unconditionally constructive;" they are designed to improve one's ability
to work together with another person or group and simultaneously
advance one's substantive interest. The recipe consists of six ingredients:
(1) balance emotions with reason; (2) try to understand them; (3) consult
them before deciding on matters that affect them; (4) be reliable; (5)
be open to persuasion and try to persuade them; and (6) accept them
as worthy of our consideration, care about them, and be open to learning
from them.
How far do these guidelines take us? At first glance, these rules
appear to be nothing more than an admonition to act intelligently. But
there is more to it. For instance, Getting Together's discussion of
reliability contains thoughtful insights regarding the differences between
trustworthiness, reliability, and risks. But the tone of "do-goodism"
remains. Getting Together's authors repeatedly - and defensively - defend
their comments from the anticipated charge of being "unrealistic" or
"too altruistic". They assert: "These guidelines are not advice on how
to be 'good', but rather on how to be effective. They derive from a
selfish, hard-headed concern with what each of us can do, in practical
terms, to make a relationship work better. The high moral content of
the guidelines is a bonus."' But Getting Together cannot have it both
ways.
What gives these guidelines their apparent "high moral content" is
what the authors refer to as their reciprocal character. That is, they
claim that these guidelines substantively do not give an advantage to
any particular party; in Rawlsian terms, they are fair procedures arrived
at in the original position.' What Getting Together asserts is that if all
parties to a dispute abide by them, no one's self-interest need be
compromised; going even further, Getting Together claims that acting
on these guidelines even when the other parties violate them is not
contrary to one's self-interest. But these arguments fail at both the
conceptual and practical level.
The Getting Together principles gain their "high moral content" not
from the authors' notion of reciprocity (which they take to be a rather
8. Id. at 38.
9. J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17 (1971).
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simplistic interpretation of the Golden Rule) but from the relatec
philosophical principle of universilizability. In trying to be "realistic,"
Getting Together argues that "[r]eliance on reciprocal good is not a
sound foundation on which to build a working relationship."'" "To pursue
a comprehensive approach resting on the premise that others will follow
our example is highly risky and unwise."" Yet, the authors claim that
what makes their prescriptions plausible is that they pass requirements
for a successful strategy that themselves are non-biased. How can these
two strands mesh?
Getting Together confuses the roles that the "unconditionally con-
structive" principles play. The universalizability principle helps us to
determine what constitutes the morally right course of action; Getting
Together's warning about reciprocity is based on predicting whether the
other parties will in fact act in a way that we believe is justifiably
universalizable. These are consistent claims, but the next step is de-
batable. All Getting Together's prescriptions are, to use lawyer's jargon,
procedural; they are formal requirements for conduct. But are there no
substantive (material) principles that should be part of the building
blocks for determining what is the right thing to do when building a
relationship? For instance, should substantive principles of equality be
a part of an "unconditionally constructive strategy"? That is, can two
parties, one of whom is extremely wealthy and the other desperately
poor, establish a robust working relationship without having to address
the question of restoring some material equity to the situation? While
the answer might be arguable, Getting Together cannot blithely ignore
the challenge, for either answer undercuts its thesis at a practical level.
If the only material requirement supporting the "unconditionally
constructive strategy" is to advance selfish interests (or, more charitably
put, self-interest), then the practical relevance of Getting Together's
advice becomes questionable. For instance, what is a negotiator supposed
to do if his negotiating counterpart does not understand him? Surely
the Powelton residents would be justified in believing that MOVE
members did not try to understand their concerns, fears, and aspirations.
Assume that they had made a good faith effort at understanding the
MOVE philosophy. What were they then supposed to do? This is where
Getting to Yes,'2 the precursor to Getting Together, enters. Presuming
that one negotiates on a principled basis, Getting Together's advice to
Powelton residents would be that they should develop their best alter-
native to a negotiated agreement (BATNA). Given that the driving
substantive principle of that negotiating method is also that of promoting
10. Id. at 33.
11. Id.
12. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES (1981).
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one's self-interest, it is not implausible to argue that the actual outcome
of the first MOVE encounter was in fact the Powelton residents' BATNA.
But this consequence does not comport with our intuitions about what
a desirable outcome in this situation would have been.
Managing Public Disputes is more helpful to us in determining with
whom to establish a working relationship and how to achieve it prac-
tically. Who should have been a party to the discussions in the Powelton
MOVE encounter? A variety of entities emerge. Neighbors formed three
different groups: Powelton United Neighbors (anti-police); Powelton
Emergency Human Rights Committee (anti-MOVE); and the Tuesday
Night Group (a 'good neighbor' group trying to reconcile competing
claims). The "City" could readily be subdivided into the Mayor's office,
the police, the District Attorney's office, and the judge. The intervenor's
challenge is to construct a meeting format that enables the various
discussions to proceed compatibly. Managing Public Disputes's bias
would be to have representatives of all these constituent entities convene
together, using sub-groups to deal with more focused concerns. Such
an arrangement might strike the average reader as unwieldy and un-
workable, but Managing Public Disputes offers detailed suggestions for
managing such a dialogue. The skeptic need only be reminded that the
heroic efforts of Palmer and Gaskins that led to the agreement on the
fifth of May systematically excluded participation by the neighborhood
residents; had they been included even in an advisory or consulting
capacity, the collective support and understanding of the terms of the
agreement might have generated less tension and apprehension regarding
the compliance problems that later plagued and ultimately destroyed
that document.
Even if discussions occurred bilaterally among the various parties
rather than all parties meeting together in one encompassing forum,
Managing Public Disputes provides helpful suggestions for strategically
tracking everyone's interests, positions, and concerns so that those who
assume responsibility for managing the discussions gain maximum le-
verage for generating flexibility and movement by the negotiating parties;
Managing Public Disputes's discussion of and suggestions for analyzing
a conflict situation constitute an extremely valuable contribution to the
literature and practice of nonviolent conflict resolution. The specific
components for producing constructive dialogue become critical. De-
veloping ground rules for discussion, integrating the decision-making
procedures of the various parties into the negotiating timetable, defining
issues in non-partisan terms, selecting discussion strategies that enable
parties to continually build upon developing settlement components,
dealing with the media in a manner that enhances public comprehension,
protecting constructive discussions from being sabotaged by unpredict-
able developments, and creating mechanisms for gaining compliance
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
with negotiated outcomes are just some of the guideposts around which
effective negotiations pivot. There is no longer any excuse for intervenors,
however well-intentioned, to feel or be at a loss for how to proceed.
But neither are there any shortcuts or "quick fixes". The job of building
agreements frequently is a time-consuming, exhaustive undertaking that
tries the collective patience, imagination, and resourcefulness of all
participants. No one can guarantee successful outcomes if they follow
procedures and analyses such as those offered by Managing Public
Disputes, but it is certainly true that the "do whatever works" philosophy
for intervenors is as false as it is unhelpful.
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROGRAMS
What relevance do the above comments have for those persons
professionally involved in dispute resolution and those legislators, court
administrators and judges who establish or monitor court-annexed me-
diation programs?
The MOVE incident provides a dramatic challenge to the alleged
distinction between process and substance that Getting Together, Man-
aging Public Disputes, and others routinely advance. While no one
contests the proposition that some matters relate to concerns of procedure
and others to substance, what frequently creeps into the discussion is
the claim that intervenors need to be primarily "process" rather than
"substantive" experts. Indeed, one frequent criticism of lawyers serving
as mediators is that they do not, as a group, pay sufficient attention
to process concerns. But part of the "process" is being perceived as
credible by the disputants. Establishing that credibility in the MOVE
scenario required Palmer and Gaskins to "...literally almost live in
MOVE's compound six to nine months, day and night."' 3 All, of course,
without pay. Would members of the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution, for example, be willing to make a similar commitment of
time and energy? The notable absence of any trained mediators in recent
explosive racial, religious, and ethnic controversies in the major cities
of New York, Miami, and Chicago suggest that the professional dispute
resolvers have chosen to ignore commentator James Laue's perceptive
counsel that since good crisis intervention consumes much political
capital, "that capital should be built between the third party and other
parties in non-crisis situations."" That insight, of course, is at odds with
the professional's claim that he or she can serve in any kind of dispute
13. H. ASSEFA & P. WAHRHAFrIG, supra note 1, at 81.
14. Id. at 135, quoting Laue, Third Party Roles in Community Conflict: The MOVE
Experience, 2 CONFLICT RES. NoTEs 4, 14 (1986).
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because of his or her expertise in "process." Effective mediation for
certain situations is not consistent with the image of a jet-set mediator.
But intervenor credibility also stems from the fact that he or she
adds something constructive to the discussion; a knowledge of some
aspects of the matters in dispute is essential in order for one to appreciate
real-world constraints and to be creative in developing options to honor
them. Gaskins' knowledge of the criminal law process was critical to
breaking the impasse that had developed in the Powelton crisis. But if
credibility is established by parties having confidence in both the person
and his or her knowledge, then it seems difficult to object to legislators
who impose academic and professional qualifications on mediators serving
in court-annexed programs in the probably justified belief that parties
and their counsel would have confidence in such individuals. Yet, much
ink has been spilled lately claiming that imposing such qualifications
for mediator service arbitrarily excludes competent persons from serving
in the fastest growing sectors of mediation practice. While I share the
concern that such qualifying guidelines will generate panels of mediators
serving in court-based programs that have a disproportionately fewer
number of minority and female persons who are otherwise competent
to mediate, I am not convinced that the way in which to guard against
that development is to deny the relevance of professional credentials.
The MOVE experience also presses us to examine the mediator's
standard rhetoric regarding neutrality. One can justifiably criticize the
intervenor's behavior in the first MOVE crisis as being nonneutral in
an essential sense when, in the guise of a mediator's settlement proposal,
he regurgitated terms that were practically identical to all of those being
advanced by the city.'5 But how far does the concept of neutrality
properly extend? Anyone raised in a conventional environment must
certainly be able to empathize with the exasperation that Powelton
residents, city officials, and various intervenors experienced in dealing
with the MOVE members. But there is an underlying sense pervading
the attitude of the various players, including the intervenors, that "in
the end, you (MOVE) should do what everyone else believes is rea-
sonable." Is that consistent with a posture of neutrality?
The same attitude is displayed by court-designated mediators who
admonish the stubborn party that it had better change its tune or the
court will dictate an outcome. If Getting Together is correct in asserting
that it is just in those situations when differences are most dramatic
that we must redouble our efforts to sustain a working relationship,
then perhaps it is not misplaced to demand that our mediators resist
natural inclinations borne of training and experience to conclude what
things are possible and what are not. But there surely are limits to this
15. Id. at 53.
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posture that are grounded in normative political commitments, not simply
fatigue or lack of imagination; articulating what they are, or at least a
framework for putting the question, remains a challenging agenda item
for dispute intervenors.
The image suggested by Getting Together, Managing Public Disputes,
and others, is that since neutral intervenors are "process experts" only,
no behavior or principles serve to offend or restrict them from serving
in a dispute. Our experience suggests the contrary. Every intervenor in
the MOVE crisis was committed to developing settlement terms that
would avoid acts of violence; others were deterred from serving for fear
that their agency's budget would be decimated by disgruntled city
officials. What other substantive positions shape the mediator's role?
Frequent candidates are that the mediator of a divorce proceeding has
an affirmative duty to protect the interests of the children, or the
lawyer/mediator has an ethical duty to prevent a pro se party from
agreeing to settlement terms that the lawyer/mediator knows are sub-
stantially less generous than those accorded to that party by law. The
challenge of the meaning of a mediator's neutrality is put in its starkest
terms when dealing with an "extremist group" such as MOVE because
that group claims to reject as legitimate the fundamental institutions
and values of the society of which the mediator is a part. How can the
mediator be "neutral" and simultaneously remain committed to the very
institutions that one party is explicitly rejecting? In court-annexed me-
diation programs, the dilemma arises when someone is mediating a
dispute involving laws whose application one party is trying to escape
because it believes them to be oppressive, unfair, wicked, or self-
destructive. Can the mediator ignore those laws or escape their influence
if the opponent is intent upon having them apply? Developing a con-
ceptual account of the role of the court-appointed mediator who is
someone other than a compliance officer remains an urgent task.
If claims of "situational mediator ethics and neutrality" lose their
luster upon closer examination, we certainly are inclined to believe that
mediator tactics and procedures vary according to context. Managing
Public Disputes portrays in illuminating detail the methods that inter-
venors of multi-party public controversies dealing with land use, water
resources, or garbage disposal should deploy in gathering initial infor-
mation, identifying appropriate negotiating parties, and gaining com-
mitments from all to a detailed set of groundrules that shall govern the
discussions. Most do not believe that such a panoply of arrangements
are required for a straightforward mediation of a marital dissolution or
a small claims court matter; most mediator training programs reflect
this bias. But perhaps we are being shortsighted in this regard. Struc-
turing the discussion of interested grandparents in a marital dissolution
mediation immediately takes on the characteristics of intervening in
[Vol. 4:2 1989]
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multi-party disputes. Guiding settlement discussions as a court-appointed
Special Master for the Agent Orange litigation, the RICO charges
against the Long Island Lighting Company that are tied to legislative
approval of a negotiated agreement to close a nuclear power plant, or
the conflicting claims of twenty-seven parties to litigation arising from
the collapse of a bridge demand just the kind of meticulous care,
concern, and process that a MOVE intervention would require. We must
honestly examine whether our reluctance to be open to such consider-
ations in court-annexed mediation systems stem from institutional con-
cerns regarding efficient case processing, limited economic resources,
and a general impatience for seemingly protracted settlement discussions
rather than from the allegedly inherent differences between case types.
Perhaps most fundamentally, we do not know what constitutes a case.
At one level, of course, the answer is obvious: it is a matter defined
by the legal claims being pressed. In court-annexed mediation programs,
it is that legally defined matter that is typically referred to mediation.
That notion of a case is useful but not dispositive. Some matters involving
neighbors, for instance, are referred to mediation prior to formal legal
charges being filed, so the agenda of claims eligible for mediation is
not firmly established. But many mediation advocates claim that part
of the value of a mediated negotiation process is that parties can address
and resolve matters of fundamental concern to them whether or not
such concerns constitute legal causes of action; defendants in employment
discrimination cases, for example, are arguably more amenable to con-
sidering settlement options if they can also candidly discuss and develop
measures to handle morale problems that might stem from such a
resolution, even though morale consequences are irrelevant to the legal
claims at issue. But if those matters can be negotiated, what else is
eligible? Surely lines must be drawn so that every mediation session is
not converted into a long-term psychological counseling session or a
searching seminar on one's philosophy of life; at the same time, however,
court-referred mediation conferences should be something more than an
intervenor's assessment of the strengths of the competing legal cases.
Drawing that line is a constant challenge. Imagine the surprise a mediator
would have experienced had some of the Powelton residents filed mis-
demeanor claims against the MOVE members for harassment and the
matter was referred to mediation. What would have been the parameters
of the "case" she would have addressed?
There are, of course, answers to these questions. The value of ex-
amining the hard case for mediators is that it exposes our fundamental
beliefs regarding the goals and value of mediated negotiation and its
appropriate context of application. It helps illuminate the tension felt
between those who advocate its use as a vehicle of democratic decision-
making and those who value it as an efficient tool of court administration;
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it reveals the trade-offs we inevitably make when deciding which matters
should be referred to mediation, the extent of the resources allocated
to serve that caseload, and the qualifications of the persons authorized
to serve as mediators. As the authors of each of these books remind
us, we must combine confidence in what we have learned works well
in dispute resolution activity with a healthy dose of humility based on
how little we know about the "laws" of human behavior. There is no
magic in dispute resolution. In the best tradition of the American
Pragmatism with which Holmes is frequently identified, we must proceed
to explore the possibilities and limits of varying dispute settlement
processes with that experimental frame of mind that enables the life
of the process to be not dogma but experience.
